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I.
INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology to simplify automatic identification of objects with electromagnetic fields. In general, RFID tags can be divided into two categories, active and passive. Active tags require a power source, while passive ones do not rely on power source. This paper interests on passive tags because the tags do not require batteries and low production and maintenance cost. In addition, they also have an indefinite operational life and are small enough to fit into a practical adhesive label.
Figure 1. RFID communication model
Generally, RFID systems consist of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and RFID readers. While RF tags operate as transponders, RF readers act as transceivers. In case of a more complex application, a database server is required to store information comes from both transponders and receivers sides [1] .
The bandwidth for RFID communication systems is relatively low in several kBit per second.
Although this is very small compared to other wireless technologies, recent modes offer higher data rates due to only small data is exchanged with a single tag. The bandwidth is more appropriate to perform scanning to all tags in the operation range of a reader within a short time [5] .
Low cost RFID is attractive for wider implementation (replacing magnetic stripe cards and classical contact smartcards) in logistics, point-of-sale checkouts, animal identification, item management in libraries, and waste management [2] . In addition, more sophisticated RFID tags are used for higher value items in more complex applications such as ticketing, electronic purse, key, access control for various facilities, and even for human body [2, 34] .
In this paper, author look at its potential application in vehicle management in developing countries by embedding RFID tag within vehicle license plate. Hwang, et.al [33] describes various techniques used to design a prototype of RFID based vehicle license plate in 900 MHz band. Through such innovation it is believed that government will have a better automatic public vehicles management while simplify road toll and it also may be used as anti-theft device for vehicles [31, 32] .
The issue is low cost RFID tag difficult to provide strong security and privacy mechanism, while improving high level of security will lead to increasing of RFID cost. Leaving government in developing country to adopt low cost and unsecure RFID tag to deal will public vehicle management will eventually result in security and privacy issues in the future.
Therefore, it is important to look at state of art on RFID authentication protocols that compromise security mechanisms in one hand and keeping low cost of RFID tag production on the other hand.
This review provides foundation for academia, professionals and government policy makers to decide which protocol to be adopted in the future.
In the second section, several RFID attacks and its characteristics are described. Section 3 serves as literature review for several RFID authentication protocols under low cost boundaries. In addition, in depth evaluation of the protocols based on three security and privacy perspectives namely data protection, tracking prevention, and forward security are given in section 4.
Eventually, conclusions and future research direction are drawn in the last section.
II. RFID ATTACKS
Attacks on RFID technology has been a hot area of research. Inherently, RFID was designed with lack of security and privacy mechanism which eventually leads to different types of attack. This paper classifies these attacks according to the location where the attacks occur. In this regard, attacks location are categorized into air interface, reader, and systems.
A. Attacks on the Interface RFID suffers from this kind of attack which occurs on the interface. Examples of this type are eavesdropping, jamming, relay and replay attacks. Eavesdropping is considered as basic threats to RFID systems. In this case, eavesdroppers could impersonate a target tag without knowing the tag's internal secrets. The eavesdropped information could for example be used to collect privacy sensitive information about a person [12] [13] .
Jamming attack means a deliberate attempt to disturb the air interface between RFID reader and tag and thereby attacking the integrity or the availability of the communication. This could be achieved by powerful transmitters at a large distance, but also through more passive means such as shielding. As the air interface is not very robust, even simple passive measures can be very effective [14] .
A relay attack [15] for contactless cards is similar to the well known man-in-the-middle attack.
In this type of attack, attacker sits in the middle of two ways communications and receives data from with both the reader and the victim's card. It is proven that this kind of attack also able to collect sensitive information of the RFID users.
In contrast to relay attack, in replay attack an attacker reuses communications from previous sessions to perform a successful authentication between a tag and a server. If a valid RFID signal can be intercepted and the data is recorded, this data can later be retransmitted to the reader.
Because the data appears valid, the system accepts it and therefore users' information can be gained inappropriately. [16] B. Attacks on the Readers
In contrast to previous type of attack, the main target of this kind of attack is the reader. It attempts to falsify reading processes. Physical attack is an example of this type. It is the most common and considered as the most traditional attack which may lead to denial of service attack if the RFID tags are removed or broken. Unauthorized person could remove tags or put in foillined booster bag that will block RFID reader's request and temporarily deactivate the tag.
Another example of attack is falsifying reader ID. In a secure RFID system the reader must authenticate to the tag. Illegal reader may falsify reader ID by faking the "identity" of an authorized reader. In this case, an attacker able to read the data with his own reader, although such an attack can be "very easy" to "practically impossible" to carry out which is depending on the security measures in place.
C. Attacks on the Systems
In this category, attacks fall into three types, flooding attack, RFID exploit and RFID worm and virus. Flooding attack is performed against the database systems of RFID. If it is flooded with useless data then it will lead to denial of service attack. An attacker could attach RFID on other items causing RFID system to record useless data which will flood an RFID system with more data it can handle. 
III. LOW COST RFID AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
Increasing RFID security and privacy threats in the past decade have resulted in tremendous number of authentication protocols. However, increasing security and privacy mechanisms usually leads to increase of RFID tag cost. This is considered as a very challenging task where the protocol should provides strong RFID authentication mechanism within the low cost limitation. Low cost RFID tags are very limited devices with very constrained (less than 1K logic gates to security related tasks) computationally.
In current literature [35] , there are nine protocols that strictly consider low cost boundaries while offering robust security and privacy mechanism in various ways. They are One Time Password introduced by Juels, et.al [2] with a simple XOR operation. External Re-Encryption as proposed in [4] which utilize simple public key cryptosystem, Hash-based Authentication developed by
Ohkubo et al. [7] , Blocker Tag as a simple RFID tag blocking mechanism offered in [3] , Extended Hash-lock by Weis et al. [8] , Hash-based Varying Identifier as another protocol with hash function proposed in [5] , Improved Hash-based Varying Identifier as proposed in [9] which focus on preventing "man in the middle" attack under low cost RFID circumstances, Mutual
Authentication protocols as presented in [10, 11, 28] , Ultra Lightweight method which was introduced by Peris-Lopez . [24, 26, 27] .
In depth discussion and analysis the protocols mentioned above are provided in the following sections.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, assessment of the low cost authentication protocols will be based on three main security and privacy features namely data protection, tracking prevention, and forward security.
The term of data protection refer to ability to maintain data confidentiality and privacy of tag bearers. While tracking prevention refers to protection capability of location privacy of tag bearers, and forward security means ability to preserve history even after the secrets or keys have been exposed.
A. One-time Pad based on XOR
This method was proposed by Juels [2] . It requires a very simple XOR operation, therefore low computational cost for RFID is satisfied. A reader (or a back-end server) has the common list of randomly generated key for each tag. The reader and the tag find that both of them have the same key of the key list with several message exchanges between them. Then, the tag transmits its ID to the reader. However, this method needs several message exchanges for authentication between the tag and the reader. Besides, the common key list must be refreshed to guarantee the security.
Although it seems provide appropriate tracking protection, it could not satisfy data privacy protection. Another limitation is that the protocol does not provide forward security. These are problems for implementation and system efficiency.
Illustration of passive attacks on XOR based RFID protocol is presented in [36] . 
C-π = IDS next -IDS
While observing the external exchanged public messages, if two successive authentication sessions satisfy final equation, then the secret value of ID is compromised and will be easily obtained by attacker [36] .
B. External Re-Encryption Scheme
External Re-Encryption Scheme was proposed in [14] . This method is aimed at protecting RFID security by using public key cryptosystem. This scheme is considered as a low cost protocol since it only utilizes two main mechanisms to authenticate RFID communications.
First, tag data is re-encrypted when a user requires using the data transferred from an external unit. As public key encryption needs high computation cost, a tag cannot process for itself. Thus, this job is generally processed by a reader.
Second, each tag data is randomly shown until next session, the attacker eavesdrop the tag data cannot trace the tag for long-term period therefore, data privacy protection is guaranteed. B However, this method has limitations to frequently refresh each tag's data since the encrypted ID stored on tag is constant so that user location privacy is compromised. Therefore, it does not fully protect users' privacy. In addition, forward security is not covered by this protocol.
C. Hash Chain-based Scheme
Ohkubo et al. [7] proposed a hash-based authentication protocol. The aim of the protocol is to provide better protection of user privacy with the basic concept of refreshing the identifier of the tag each time it is queried by a reader. The protocol changes RFID identities on each read based on hash chains. Hash chain method is used in this two ways communication of RFID tag. This work was adopted in [30] by enhancing unilateral randomly authentication protocol using oneway hash function. Even though the protocol does not require a random number generator, it seems satisfy data protection of RFID tags as well as provides adequate tracking prevention.
However, this protocol is flawed to certain replay attacks which makes it difficult to guarantee forward security.
D. Blocker Tag
This protocol was introduced by Juels, et.al. [3] . The approach uses an individual tag, namely blocker tag for each tag and according to its purpose. To protect a tag's data, the blocker tag responses for attacker's request to get the tag's data. The response from the blocker tag is not for the tag but all tags. Thus, the attacker cannot distinguish the tag's data. This method basically uses binary tree walking protocol as a collision-avoidance mechanism as can be seen in figure 1 . Using the binary tree-based protocol, this method has advantages that the range of protecting tags can be efficiently specified into specific area of the binary tree [3] . Doing so, the area of protecting tags is divided into multiple privacy zones and the performance of tree walking can be efficient. This method also provides zone policy to apply protection policy according to various purposes. This method is currently considered as a practical solution for the existing RFID privacy and security protection by adequately maintain tracking prevention and forward security.
Problem is that additional blocker tag is needed for every tag and it is susceptible whether tag namely hash-lock and extended hash-lock schemes. However, the last name is widely used to identify this unique protocol. Both protocols employed different ways of hash functions.
As can be seen in figure 3 , hash-lock scheme uses a back-end server to store keys k in its database for all tags. Each tag unique key with metaID = h(k) as its key. The tag transmits metaID as a response to a reader's query to the tag. Unfortunately, this protocol fails to overcome eavesdrop attacks since metaID is always constant which opens tracing problem. Therefore, location privacy of tag bearers is compromised. Although this scheme provides strong authentication and prevents from the replay attacks, the tag can be traced if the tag's ID is exposed. In addition, an adversary can query a tag to get a tag's valid message pair (c; r). Later on, the attacker can impersonate that tag to a legitimate reader. As a result, the protocol could not fully satisfy data protection and forward security issues.
F. Hash-based Varying Identifier
Another hash-based approach is hash-based varying identifier proposed by Henrici and Muller [5] . Their scheme also adopts a hash function and a random number generator, but a pseudo random number is generated by a back-end server and transmitted to the tag for every interrogation to make the tag's queried identifier random and preserve location privacy. Figure 5 shows the overall system architecture of this protocol is quite similar to that of other previous works. In server side, DataBase-ID is exist and is set according to the database which will be in charge of the tag and ID, TID and LST of a tag. These are set to a random value initially. A corresponding row in the database ID, TID and LST is similar to the tag. Then HID is set to h(ID) and is used as a primary index. The database manages a pair of record to guarantee message recovery for any data loss using AE fields which pointing each other.
This protocol basically focuses on securing location privacy problems by making a tag's ID randomized in every interrogation. However, location privacy of tag bearers is compromised since the response of tag is constant until the next authentication session. Therefore, attackers able to track tag bearers whose tags are long-distance from readers and scarcely have chance to be queried.
Yet, by employing TIDs, the replay attacks cannot compromise the scheme since tags and backend servers are mutually authenticated in every single interrogation. Errors in message transfer can be detected and the scheme is reliable for data loss since it can provide the data from the previous record. In short, forward security is not well provided. Hwang et al. [9] proposed an improved authentication protocol of hash-based varying identifier.
The main difference between this protocol and the previous ones is that a reader utilizes what is called a random number generator (RNG) to protect the man-in-the-middle attack. reader as a new model. As a result, this scheme needs only 1l-field for a unique ID and its challenge and response phase uses a half length of R (R = h(ID||S)) so that its communication performance is more efficient than [7] . The scheme protects the location privacy as a tag's unique identifier is changed in every read attempts. The replay attacks cannot compromise the scheme since tags and back-end servers are mutually authenticated.
However, this scheme is still vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack particularly if there is no guarantee that the reader is a trusted party. In short, although the protocol is claimed appropriate to protect traceability of user privacy, the protocol is still suffered from such attacks due to the ID of the tag remains constant until the next authentication session. During this limited period, adversaries can track tag bearers whose tags are long-distance from readers and scarcely have chance to be queried.
H. Mutual Authentication
In this protocol is claimed satisfies the low-cost requirement of RFID tags, it's highly dependable on back-end database is confirmed as a serious limitation [11] .
Highly dependent on database server is criticized in [28] . In reality, connection between the RFID reader and the central database do not always available thus fully relying on a central database means creating a single point of failure, opening up the entire RFID system to denial of service attacks [28] .
In addition, two types RFID mutual authentication protocols both without database server was proposed. The first protocol performs challenge and response before sending the tag secret to the reader, whilst in the second version the tag secret is sent in such a way that only an authenticated reader can decrypt it.
This work was then improved in [11] which enable the removal of reliable consistent connections between RFID readers with their database server without the timestamps as can be seen from The protocol enables not only RFID tag to authenticate RFID reader but also the latter to authenticate RFID tag. It is confirmed that the protocol satisfy the requirement of both data protection and tracking prevention [11] . However, we found that it does not fully guarantee forward security.
I. Ultra Lightweight
While various hash formulas are usually applied to increase RFID security, ultra-lightweight security proposed by Lopez et.al [24] , [26] , [27] maintain security and privacy of RFID using simple operation. They introduced three protocols namely, Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol (LMAP) [24] and Minimalist Mutual-Authentication Protocol (M2AP) [26] and Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol (EMAP) [27] . Instead of using advanced hash formula, they use XOR, OR, AND, mod 2m.. In general, the protocols use a 480 EEPROM and a 96-bit
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key divided into 4 parts updates after each message cycle. Preventing users from privacy location tracking and re-transmission attacks is the key feature of the protocols [24] , [26] , [27] . Similar to LMAP, M2AP protocol also employs 300 gates. As shown in figure 9 , the only difference is that in this protocol there is an additional E value to add more security in database authentication compare to LMAP method [26] . Though it is efficient in that it uses some calculations for authentication, [28] confirm that it fails to provide strong integrity since it does not use hash formulas or encryption algorithms. Therefore, there is a possibility to track user location when the final session is concluded irregularly and also the IDS and key values are not refreshed.
The last protocol is called Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol or EMAP. This method is considered as the most efficient method among ultra-lightweight protocols, since it only uses 150 gates to provide security of RFID [27] . In his method, the 4 keys, which have been divided from message E, produce the XOR algorithm sigma value (K1K2K3K4) by which provide a more accurate way of authentication. The 96 bit ID can be divided into two, resulting in the use of a 1~48 bit ID and a 49~96 bit ID, which results in the use of 2 identification values. By inputting the key value into the formula, the safety of the system is enhanced. This method is more effective than the two previously mentioned systems, and can provide security within close ranges. However, it can be exposed to 3rd party tapping, message fabrication, or forgery over long ranges [28] .
Figure 10. EMAP Scheme
Although the method is quite unique and fit to low cost limitation, the three protocols also criticized in terms of several weaknesses. As confirmed by Li et.al [29] who reveal these weaknesses by arguing that the protocols are not robust since there is no guarantee that the tag really recognize whether the replying messages are indeed received and verified by a legitimate reader or not.
As illustrated in [29] , bit de-synchronization attack is a kind of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) applied to change message C in EMAP. The attack firstly performs eavesdrop on the protocol message exchange to obtain A||B||C. It then changes A||B||C to become A||B||C' , where C'0= C I 0 a nd I 0 =(000 … 001) 3 . Similarly, the attacker changes the reply D and E from the tag to D'
and E', respectively. As can be seen above, the tag might still accept compute the reply message based on the modified values in the received message. If this message is accepted by the reader, then the mutual authentication exist which mean both the reader and the tag will update their secrets to the attacker.
Likewise, they also proof how vulnerable these protocols from full Disclosure attacks. The attack is done by repeatedly running the incomplete protocol many times at the tag side. This action will make the tag expecting that a completion message from the reader to update its secret. If the attacker can discharge the tag in a brute force way immediately after it sends out the reply message, all the secret information in the tag can be extracted [29] . As a result, ultra lightweight protocols also do not provide full protection for forward security and location tracking.
After presenting advantages and disadvantages of all low cost RFID authentication protocols above, the author conclude the analysis in the following table [35] . In short, it is clearly seen that each low cost protocol has different security characteristics and no single protocol offers full security features. In the future, findings derived from this study will serve as the basis for government policy maker to select the right low cost RFID authentication protocols for RFID license plate under multi criteria decision analysis (MCDA) environment.
